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of the word ownership, the court should correct the acci-
dent of time and circumstances by simply abandoning
its use.
V. Is IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN
OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION IN
LARCENY CASES?
Since the Maryland Court of Appeals seems to allow
proof of rightful possession to support an allegation of
ownership whenever it is important to the decision in a par-
ticular case, it may be argued that the court means "posses-
sion" when it uses the word "ownership," and that no real
problem exists. However, this argument ignores an im-
portant fact - that no one can be sure that the court in
the future in a given case will so interpret the word. A dis-
tinction between the words "ownership" and "possession"
should be made in order to eliminate possible future mis-
conception as to what amounts to the crime of larceny.
As long as the Court of Appeals adheres to the vague rule
that proof of ownership is an essential element of larceny,
there is room for confusion and uncertainty. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals would do well to enunciate a clear,
definitive statement of what it means by "ownership" as
used in larceny cases.39
Deceptive Reference To Manufacturer's List Price As
Unfair Trade Practice
Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC1
Petitioner, a Delaware corporation operating retail
stores in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, including
Maryland, sought review of a cease and desist order issued
against it by the Federal Trade Commission. The order
include any part owner, or person having possession or control of, or a
special property in, anything capable of being stolen. * * * It must be
proved upon the trial, that the goods stolen are the absolute or special
property of the persons named in the indictment."
8 It is true that other courts have used the words "ownership" and
"possession" interchangeably as perhaps the Maryland Court of Appeals
is doing. E.g., People v. Edwards, 72 Cal. App. 102, 236 Pac. 944 (1925).
But the court in this case made it clear that it did not intend to change
the common law definition of the crime. See p. 950: "Considered as an
element of larceny, 'ownership' and 'possession' may be regarded as
synonymous terms; for one who has the right of possession as against
the thief is, so far as the latter is concerned, the owner." This brief
statement shows how simply the problem can be dealt with.
'322 F. 2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
GIANT FOOD, INC. v. FTC
was aimed at Giant's practice of comparing its prices to the
"manufacturer's list price" in advertising small appliances,
although in fact the manufacturer's list price was not the
usual and customary retail price in the area. The FTC had
held Giant's practice to be in violation of section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act 2 prohibiting "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce". The petitioner
contended that its form of advertising was legitimate for
purposes of price comparison. The Court of Appeals, in
affirming the FTC order, held that, although such reference
to manufacturer's list prices was not unlawful per se, it
would constitute a deceptive trade practice if it could
reasonably be interpreted to be misleading to the public.
Under the broad prohibition of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act,' the FTC has concerned itself with
a great variety of business practices. One group of these
practices may be classified as misrepresentation, and in-
volves misleading or deceptive conduct operating primarily
to injure the consuming public." Usually competitors are
affected by misrepresentation only indirectly, where they
suffer a diversion of trade to a rival.' The instant case,
which is an example of such misleading or deceptive prac-
tice, deals with price advertising, a subject that has been
under increasing scrutiny by the FTC6 because of the grow-
ing importance of that practice in the changing competitive
conditions of modern business.
By the terms of the statute, the FTC has been given
virtual carte blanche to determine what constitutes an
unfair or deceptive trade practice, subject to the require-
ments of due process and sufficiency of evidence. To this
'Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
315 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958). "Unfair methods of competition in commerce
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are declared
unlawful."
'87 C.J.S. Trademarks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition § 228(b)
(1954). "[I]t is not necessary to find actual deception or that any [specific]
competitor has been damaged, and a cease and desist order is justified ...
on the assumption that deception necessarily tends to promote unfair
competition." Id. at 645.
5 Electro Thermal Co. v. Federal Trade Commissioner, 91 F. 2d 477
(1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 748 (1937).
aBNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 130, at A-9 (Jan. 7, 1964).
738 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). The statute
itself nowhere gives any specific criteria as to what will constitute "unfair
methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive acts or practices". See also
2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7000 (1964) which notes that "the terms are not defined
in the act" and the businessman seeking guidance must look to the rulings
of the Commission and the courts to determine whether the practice has
been ruled on and under what circumstances it might be unfair.
815 U.S.C. § 45(b)(c) (1958). See also 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1960) (evi-
dence) ; 16 C.F.R. § 3.16 (1960) (hearings) ; 87 C.J.S. Trademarks, Trade-
19641
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end, it has set up certain standards of its own - industry
trade practice rules and/or Guides - to which it refers in
deciding whether a practice is or is not unfair. These are
used in conjunction with its previous findings and, in any
given case, may be subject to such other guidelines as
seem applicable.9
The FTC Guides on deceptive pricing, promulgated in
1958,10 were based on certain general principles of inter-
pretation stated therein. These principles indicate the basic
outlines of FTC policy regarding pricing: advertisements
and representations generally are considered in their en-
tirety, with an eye to the over-all impression they produce
upon the public rather than what their literal meaning may
be; and ambiguous representations are read so as to protect
the trusting, and not just the sophisticated, customer, re-
gardless of whether or not there was any deliberate at-
tempt to mislead.
The 1958 Guides were recently revised and have been
superseded by a new set, adopted December 20, 1963.11
These revised Guides do not indicate any change in the
fundamental principles outlined in the former Guides, but
they do represent an attempt by the FTC to furnish the
businessman with a more concrete practical aid in conform-
ing his conduct to the desired standards of fairness in the
field of price advertising.
Specifically, the 1963 Guides divide the types of pricing
practices regulated into five classes,12 each covered by one
Guide clearly spelling out the requirements for the prac-
tices with which it deals.
Guide 1. Former price comparisons. These involve an
offered reduction from the advertiser's own former price.
The former price must be the actual bona fide price at
Names. and Unfair Competition § 222 stating that the general rules of evi-
dence in criminal prosecution apply and that evidence must be sufficient to
establish the particular offense charged beyond a reasonable dbubt (1954).
Id. § 230(c) noting the requirement of a fair and public hearing at a rea-
sonable time and place with reasonable notice to interested parties.
9 Evidence of impressions of the general public and/or jury findings on
similar or comparable fact situations may be presented at FTC hearings.
(2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7521 (19G4).) See also James S. Kirk & Co. v. FTC,
59 F. 2d 179, 183 (7th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 663 (1932) in
which the judgment of the FTC was held to be subject to a contrary inter-
pretation by the Bureau of Standards and the court said that it was
"expedient for other departments of the government, including the judiciary,
to accept such construction if for no other reason than that of consistency."
"°U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Guides Against Deceptive Pric-
ing (1958).
"12 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10 (1964).
'Ibid. It should be noted, however, that the Introduction to § 14.10
states that the Guides are not "intended to serve as comprehensive or
precise statements of law" but as practical aids only.
GIANT FOOD, INC. v. FTC
which the article was offered to the public on a regular
basis for a reasonably substantial period of time. It might
be noted that this does not necessarily preclude a former
price at which no sales were actually made. In such a case,
however, the advertiser is put on guard that the price must
be one at which the merchandise was openly and actively
offered for sale, for a reasonably substantial period of time,
in the recent, regular course of business, and in good faith.
In addition it must be clear to the public that the former
price was an asking and not a selling price, if no sales were
actually made at that price.
Any price comparison based on a fictitious former price
is prohibited. Included in the prohibition are deliberately
inflated mark-ups,'13 prices at which the article was never
offered at all, prices not used in the regular course of busi-
ness, prices used in the remote rather than the recent past,
prices not openly offered to the public, and prices not main-
tained for a reasonable time.
Advertisements not specifically mentioning the former
price but containing some general term such as "sale" or
"reduced to" must in fact offer something more than an in-
significant or nominal saving, and it is the advertiser's
responsibility to see that it does.'
Guide 2. Retail price comparisons and comparable value
comparisons. This is a commonly used form of bargain
advertising, representing that the advertiser is selling be-
low the prices being charged in his area for a particular
article or for one of like grade and quality. In such cases,
the advertiser must be reasonably certain that the higher
price to which he compares his own price does not appre-
ciably exceed the price at which substantial sales of the
article, or one essentially similar and obtainable in the
area, are being made. 15
Is For an example of this practice see People v. Minjac Corp.. 4 N.Y.
2d 320, 151 N.E. 2d 180 (1958) where toy manufacturer marked up his
original price excessively, then advertised toys at "20%-40% Off" and
sold them at prices either the same or in excess of the prevailing price in
the community.
11 People v. Minjac Corp., supra note 13.
IThe Guide (2 Trade Reg. Rep. § 14.10(a) (3) (1964)) gives as an
example of such a misleading practice: Retailer hdvertises Brand X pens
as having a "Retail Value $15.00, My Price $7.50" when in fact only a few
small suburban outlets charge $15 and all the larger outlets around the
main shopping areas charge around $7.50. See also Niresk Industries,
Inc. v. FTC, 278 F. 2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960).
This case involved a mail order business in kitchenware in which an
electric fryer was advertised in Life magazine as having a regular value of
$39.95 while the advertiser offered it for from $6.95-$8.95. The actual
retail value in the area was around $12-$20 and the advertiser's regular
price was $6.95-$8.95.
1964]
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Guide 3. Advertising retail prices which have been
established or suggested by manufacturers (or other non-
retail distributors). The practice objected to in the instant
case comes under this category and it is in this area that
the FTC has made probably the most sweeping changes in
the revised Guides.'" Involved here are advertised reduc-
tions from a manufacturer's list price or suggested retail
price. To the extent that these "list" prices do not corre-
spond to prices at which a substantial number of sales are
made, the advertisements may mislead the consumer. The
danger of deception arises on the one hand from the belief
of the general public that a suggested retail or "list" price
is the one at which an article is generally sold, and on the
other hand from the widespread failure of retailers to
observe such list prices because of the advent of broad-scale
retail discounting.
This Guide encompasses any means employed for adver-
tising such prices, including large-scale, mass media adver-
tising, pre-ticketing, direct mail advertising and distribu-
tion of promotional material or price lists to be displayed
to the public.'7 Its standards would be applicable to the
1"2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10(c) (1964). The 1958 Guides, U.S.
Federal Trade Commission, Guides Against Deceptive Pricing (1958),
dealt with this type of pricing practice under the heading of "Saving
Claims" and included under the same heading former price comparisons.
Each of these has been treated in the new Guides as a separaite category
(Guides 1 and 3), the new format presumably indicating an added import-
ance and need for reconsideration of these practices. The 1958 Guides not
only considered both practices together but dealt with them in somewhat
skeletal form. No claim "which represents or implies a reduction or saving
from an established retail price, or from the advertiser's former price"
was to be used unless:
a) the statement applies to the specific article offered for sale (as opposed
to similar or comparable merchandise) ;
b) the saving is from "the usual and customary retail price . . . in the
trade area, or areas, where the statement is made" (or, in the case of
former prices, from the "advertiser's usual and customary retail
price . . . in the recent, regular course of business") ; and
c) the statement "clearly shows whether the saving or reduction is from
the usual and customary retail price . . . in the trade area" or from
(the advertiser's former price.
There is no discussion or indication of what sort of conduct, specifically,
might reasonably be expected to meet these requirements.
The 1963 Guides undertake to give much more elaboration as to the varia-
tions of conduct covered and the reasoning likely to be applied in testing
them. This is especially marked in Guide 3 (retail prices), with which we
are primarily concerned here. This Guide does not limit itself to a flat,
general prohibition, but indicates significant factors which will be con-
sidered - advertising mechanics and methods, the understanding of the
consuming public, the influence of current retailing and advertising pat-
terns, and the size and type of the particular advertiser. Most important,
it sets out specific extamples of the kind of practice likely to be disapproved
by the FTC and the degree of honesty and good faith which will be re-
quired of the advertiser to prevent such disapproval.
112 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10(c) (2) (1964).
GIANT FOOD, INC. v. FTC
national or regional manufacturer himself, a mail-order dis-
tributor, or a local retailer, either individually or in com-
bination. 8 Obviously, not all suggested prices are fictitious,
and an advertiser should be safe in referring to them if
they are prices at which substantial, as opposed to isolated
or insignificant, sales are regularly made in his trade area.
The Guide makes a significant distinction, however, be-
tween the "standard of care" required of the local retailer,
in contrast to the large-scale regional or national manufac-
turer. The former is held to at least a general knowledge
of prices actually charged in his trade area, whereas the
latter is expected to make an honest estimate of actual
retail value but is not required to make a detailed investi-
gation of the prevailing price of his products throughout
the entire trade area. 19
Guide 4. Bargain offers based upon the purchase of
other merchandise. Such offers may take many forms
("Free", "Buy one - get one free", "2-for-1 Sale", "Half-
Price Sale", "10 Sale", "50% off") 20 but all purport to offer
bargains in the form of additional merchandise to be given
on condition the customer purchase a particular article at
the price usually asked by the advertiser. Since these are
"conditional" offers, all the terms and conditions must be
made clear at the outset.21 Furthermore, the seller may not
increase his regular price or decrease the quantity or quality
of the article required to be bought.
Guide 5. Miscellaneous price comparisons. This covers
other less common, though multitudinous, forms of bargain
advertising, controlled by the general principles discussed
heretofore. Included are various practices, some of which
were listed in the 1958 Guides as separate classes, such as
182 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10(c) (5) (1964).
2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10(c) (1964). The Guide gives a fairly
explicit indication of what is expected in each case:
As to the retailer, he is safe in using the price if a number of principal
retail outlets in the area are regularly selling the article at the manufac-
turer's suggested price. It would, however, be deceptive if the list were
being followed only by small suburban stores, house to house canvassers, and
credit houses accounting for an insubstantial volume of sales in the area.
The large-scale manufacturer will meet his burden if he advertises or
disseminates a list or pre-ticketed price in good faith (i.e., as an honest
estimate of the actual retail price, determined, for example, by a market
survey) which does not appreciably exceed the highest price at which sub-
stantial sales are made in his trade area. For an illustration of the factors
which may be involved in such a case, see Rayex Corp. v. FTC, 317 F. 2d
290 (2d Cir. 1963) where the FTC's order was set aside because there was
no evidence of actual retail prices in any given sales area of New York
City and no showing of actual recurrent and frequent sales within a
given trade area at less than the pre-ticketed price.
22 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10(d) (1) (1964).
212 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10(d) (3) (1964).
1964]
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advertising a retail price as a "wholesale" price, "fac-
tory" prices, "seconds" or "irregulars", advance sales and
"limited" offers.22 In all cases the advertisers must make
sure that the bargain offer is genuine and truthful. 3
Comparison of the revised Guides with those issued in
1958 indicates the changing standards upon which the FTC
is basing its determinations of deceptive pricing practices.
The Giant Food case, although it was decided before the
revised Guides were adopted, seems to be clearly within
the new trend, and to foreshadow the change in emphasis
which the Guides now clarify.24
The revised Guides appear to give new importance to
certain types of pricing practices which the FTC considers
to be most prevalent in business activities today and hence
most likely to require clear safeguards for the protection
of the consuming public. Most notable in this regard is the
detailed consideration given to former price comparisons
(Guide 1) and, particularly, to advertising of retail prices
established or suggested by manufacturers (Guide 3), both
of which were dealt with together as one category under
the 1958 Guides. The new Guides are considerably more
specific and detailed in attempting to indicate the bounds
of permissible conduct. They give examples not only of
practices likely to be regarded with suspicion but also of
circumstances which would operate to relieve the adver-
tiser of culpability in such cases - for example: the
geographic scope of his business, his good faith, and the
reasonableness of factors (such as market surveys or knowl-
2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10(e) (1964). The 1958 Guides listed
nine categories:
I. Saving Claims
II. Limitations on the use of saving claims
III. Comparable and Similar Merchandise
IV. "Special Sale", etc.
V. "Two For One" Sales
VI. "1/2 Price" - "10 Sale" Conditioned on Purchase of Addi-
tional Merchandise
VII. Factory or Wholesale Prices
VIII. "Pre-Ticketing"
IX. Imperfect, Irregular, Seconds
Of these, Guides IV, VII, and IX have been grouped together in the
new Guide 5.
22 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10(e) (1964).
14 It should be noted that one of the FTC Commissioners, Everette Mac-
Intyre, objected to the revised Guides on the ground that the changes made
were too sweeping, and that the previous objective tests for deception are
replaced with the subjective one of trying to read the businessman's mind.
A brief discussion of his statement appears in BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. No. 130, at A-10 (Jan. 7, 1964).
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edge of local prices) upon which list prices and price com-
parisons are based. There is less emphasis on older or
more obvious practices, such as the "two for one" and
" price" sales, lumped together in the 4th Guide, and the
"special" sales, factory or wholesale prices, and "irregular"
or "imperfect" claims, combined in the 5th.
There is more emphasis and clarification in the areas
where greater shading and more subtle misrepresentation
are possible - those concerning the use of potentially
ambiguous price comparisons in Guides 1 (advertiser's
own former prices), 2 (area retail prices and comparable
values), and 3 (manufacturer's suggested retail prices).
There is throughout an effort to deal with such compara-
tively recent business phenomena as the retail discount
house and the far-flung manufacturing-distributing empire
in such a way as to provide both the honest merchant and
the public with practical aids for their protection in adver-
tising and buying.2 5
As both the 1958 and the 1963 Guides point out in intro-
ductory material, departures from them are not unlawful
per se. 26 The determining factor in any given case prob-
ably will still be whether the average buyer, the "non-
expert", would be misled by the particular practice in-
volved,27 and not whether the representation is true or
25 For a recent case decided under the new Guides (though initiated under
the old ones) and giving some indication of changes that may be expected
in their application, see Majestic Electric Supply Co., Inc., 3 Trade Reg.
Rep. 16,825 (1964). In 1962 respondent distributor of catalog merchan-
dise was found by the hearing examiner to have engaged in deceptive price
advertising in two respects: claiming to be a "wholesale" distributor
although it dealt almost exclusively with the ultimate purchaser; and
referring to a "retail" price which was in fact a manufacturer's suggested
price higher than the usual and customary retail price in the area. The
FTC, in a ruling released March 23, 1964, affirmed the examiner's finding
in the more familiar area of "wholesale" price advertising (now covered
in Guide 5), but reversed on the reference to "retail" price (Guide 3).
In explaining the reversal, the FTC specifically referred to the new Guide 3
and pointed out that, contrary to the standards set forth there for large
regional or national distributors, there had been no showing that respond-
ent's advertised "retail" price appreciably exceeded the highest price at
which substantial sales were made in the area in which its catalog
was circulated.
"2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897, § 14.10 (Introduction) (1964).
2In FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F. 2d 069, 674 (2d Cir. 1963) the
court discusses this at some length: "The central purpose of the provisions
of the Federal Trade Commission Act ... is in effect to abolish the rule of
caveat emptor ... by a rule which gives to the consumer the right to rely
upon representations of fact as the truth.... [P]roof of intention to deceive
is not requisite . . . since the purpose of the statute is not to punish the
wrongdoer but to protect the public."
Quoting Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F. 2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942), the
court said:
"[Tlhe buying public does not ordinarily carefully study or weigh
each word in an advertisement. The ultimate impression upon the
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false in fact 28 or specifically intended to deceive.29 In the
revised criteria, however, the FTC does seem to strike a
different balance for the potentially "gray" areas to which
it gives the greatest attention (Guides 1, 2 and 3). Here,
especially in the claims involving manufacturer's list prices
or suggested retail prices, the likelihood is that the good
faith of an advertiser, if clearly ascertainable on the basis
of the given standards, may outweigh the fact that the
public or some part of it could be or has been misled to a
small degree.
All bargain advertisements have in common the crea-
tion of an impression that the customer is being offered an
opportunity to make purchases under unusually favorable
conditions, and, to the extent that such is not the case, they
have been and will continue to be found misleading and
deceptive by the FTC. The Giant Food decision, involving
as it does one of the types of price advertising given new
emphasis in the revised Guides," is indicative of the "evolv-
ing content" of a statute "designed by Congress as a flexible
concept"3' and not confined to the usual common-law
methods or tests of misrepresentation. The decision and the
Guides together are parts of a mosaic of potentially infinite
variety and variation covering virtually every aspect of
the pricing field and subject to such changing regulatory
outlines as may be dictated by current business practices.
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mind of the reader arises from the sum total of not only what is said
but also of all that is reasonably implied."
It then continues, "Unlike that abiding faith which the law has in the
'reasonlable man', it has very little faith indeed in the intellectual acuity
of the 'ordinary purchaser' who is the object of the advertising campaign."
,See also 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADE-MARKS § 19.2(a) (1),
at 341 (2d ed. 1950) : "The general public has been defined as 'that vast
multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous,
who, in making purchases . .. too often are governed by appearances and
general impressions'."
28For an elaboration of this, see Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F. 2d 654, 656
(7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957) : "A statement may be
deceptive even if the constituent words may be literally or technically
construed so as not to constitute a misrepresentation." See also Donaldson
v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 188 (1948): "Advertisements as a
whole may be completely misleading although every sentence separately
considered is literally true."
Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 116 F. 2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941) : "Whether
or not the advertiser knows the representations to be false, the deception
of purchasers and diversion of trade is the same .... Hence a deliberate
effort to deceive is not necessary to make out a case of 'using unfair
methods of competition' within the prohibitions of the statute."
8oAdvertising retail prices which have been established or suggested by
manufacturers (or other non-retail distributors). 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 7897,
§ 14.10(c) (1964).
187 C.J.S. Trademarks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition § 228(a)
(1954).
